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Abstract 
The rapid growth of online games enables firms to charge players for virtual goods they sell for use 
within their online game environments. Determining prices for such virtual goods is inherently 
challenging due to the absence of explicit supply curve as the marginal cost of producing additional 
virtual goods is negligible. Utilizing sales data, we study daily revenue of a firm operating a virtual 
world and selling cards. Explicitly, we analyze the impact of new product releases on revenue using 
ARIMA with intervention model. We show that during initial days after a new product release, the 
firm's daily revenue significantly increases. Using a quality measure, based on the Elo rating method, 
we can determine the relative good prices based on good usage. Applying this method we show that 
the rating of a product can be a good proxy for units sold. We conclude that our quality-based 
measure can be adopted for pricing other virtual goods.   
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The inception of the Internet allowed entrepreneurs to create new economies based on goods that 
have no physical properties besides some bits on a hard drive or network, commonly referred to as 
digital goods. In this work we focus on a subset of digital goods called virtual goods, goods that are 
exchanged and used only within online virtual environments. Pricing virtual goods is of great interest 
to companies operating virtual environments; the standard supply curve is no longer applicable as it 
can be set by the manufacturer at little to no additional cost. Working with an industry partner who 
sells virtual goods, we investigate how virtual goods can be priced in order to increase revenue. We 
characterize the impact of marketing externalities on revenue and show quality of virtual goods needs 
to be considered when setting prices. Accordingly, we propose a measure of quality using virtual 
goods' usage data, how players use the goods throughout gameplay. 
Virtual goods can vary dramatically from being simple goods, such as a card in a game, to rather 
complex goods, such as a complete virtual 3D environment like a home. Companies that design and 
manage virtual environments have different business models. Generally, these are categorized as 
either pay-to-play, where payment is required to access the virtual world, or free-to-play, where 
access to the game is free but virtual goods are purchased during gameplay. Our interest is in 
determining pricing of virtual goods in order to increase revenue under the free-to-play model. In 
various free-to-play games, players need a collection of items such as cards or weapons. During the 
game, players can purchase additional items either by buying individual items or through a bundle of 
unknown items referred to as packs, as is the case with our industry partner. In the latter case, the 
identity of the items is revealed after the purchase (although the probability of receiving any one item 
may be known). Additionally, as a virtual game evolves, new items are released and become available 
for purchase. We focus on pricing virtual goods when two purchase channels are available (individual 
and packs) and new items are released to the markets. 
One approach to determine prices is to the find the market equilibrium using the appropriate supply 
and demand curves. However, with many virtual goods, the marginal cost can often be assumed to be 
zero, raising the need for alternate approaches. Further, release of new goods can stimulate demand 
and alter choices made by players. Accordingly, we show how to approximate the quality of newly 
released virtual goods and use that information to set their initial prices.    
  2 
Although this work is intended to price cards that are played in an online game and enable the firm 
to increase its revenue from selling cards to players, the methods used may be applicable to different 
settings. Namely, our method can be widely applied to pricing digital goods with limited historical 
usage data, especially when it is difficult to define the supply and the demand functions and price 
may be a function of past usage. 
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 reviews background information on 
virtual worlds while Chapter 3 provides basic information on the game we study. Chapter 4 then 
explores the daily revenue of the firm using time-series analysis. The impact of new product releases 
on the daily revenue is determined by applying ARIMA modeling with intervention analysis. Chapter 
5 presents our Set-based Elo rating method to evaluate product quality derived from product usage. 
Finally, Chapter 6 concludes and further highlights the practical benefits from the study and methods 
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Chapter 2 
Virtual Worlds: Background 
In this chapter we first review related work on the online game industry, and we proceed to discuss 
two revenue models of online games. Instead of studying the players’ purchasing motivations, 
researchers tend to investigate the attributes of virtual goods that stimulate demand. Interesting 
findings from the related work inspire us to explore a pricing method using players’ usage data 
collected under a certain game environment.    
One of the most popular segments in virtual worlds is online game. It is estimated that the 
worldwide revenue from online games was $21 and $24 billion in 2012 and 2013, respectively, and is 
expected to reach $35 billion by 2018 (DFC Intelligence, 2013). This revenue comes from a variety 
of sources, such as digital delivery, subscriptions, and social networking services. As mentioned in 
Chapter 1, online games broadly have two revenue models: pay-to-play and free-to-play. Before 
2005, most online games used different variants of pay-to-play. In general, companies used a 
combination of a one-time access fee and a periodic subscription fee (Meagher and Teo, 2005). This 
approach allowed players to select a pricing method that works best for them, and allowed companies 
to extract a higher surplus from consumers. 
In a free-to-play setting, as the name suggests, accessing the game is free of charge. However, 
oftentimes players may be exposed to advertising or be incentivized to make in-game purchases of 
goods and services. As such, game companies and researchers examine games and product attributes 
that lead to players spending money during a game. For example, Lehdonvirta (2005) determines that 
it is players' motivation for playing a game that leads players to purchase various in-game virtual 
good. In a follow-up study, Lehdonvirta (2009) discusses the functional, hedonic and social attributes 
of virtual goods. The author finds that it is virtual goods’ qualities, as measured by those three 
attributes, that lead to players spending money within a game. In this thesis we do not consider the 
sociological or physiological aspects of virtual-goods, instead we assume that the goods are given and 
fixed. Our objective is to set goods’ initial prices as they are released in order to increase revenue 
over the method currently used by our industry partner.  
Nojima (2007) reveals that game players that spend real money to acquire virtual goods tend to 
play the game longer and assess the value of virtual goods during gameplay. Motivated by Nojima’s 
finding, we use product usage in the virtual environment as a proxy for the product quality. Hamari 
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and Lehdonvirta (2010) propose that game design can be integrated with marketing, exposing players 
to products throughout gameplay, such as in-game promotions (Hamari, 2009). Hamari and 
Lehdonvirta (2010) further suggest setting expiration dates or degradation rates for virtual goods to 
mimic real-world goods. Oh and Ryu (2007) propose that some virtual goods be sold for real money 
while others be sold for virtual currency (in-game currency). The reason is that actual major 
performance upgrades need to be obtained through gameplay rather than being purchased, however, 
purchases can help reduce the time needed to reach gameplay goals. 
Lehdonvirta (2005) considers operational issues when selling virtual goods. The author proposes 
using a dynamic price updating mechanism to improve revenue from virtual goods as demand 
changes over time. There are other digital goods that have similar attributes, i.e., insignificant 
marginal cost, as virtual goods, such as software service. Bala and Carr (2010) investigate both fixed 
and usage-based pricing schemes of software service in a competitive setting. In recent times, instead 
of selling goods, firms charge a subscription service fee and customers decide whether to renew the 
service after each time period (Bala, 2012). Researchers continue to study subscription-based digital 
goods that are dynamically priced at each stage of their life cycle in order to maximize total revenue. 
The general consensus is that optimal prices follow a decreasing trend (Yao et al, 2012).  
Price updating mechanisms can be placed into one of two categories: post-price mechanisms and 
price-discovery mechanisms (Elmaghraby and Keskinocak, 2003)1. Post-price mechanisms have 
sellers set goods’ prices, for example price tags are one such mechanism. Price-discovery 
mechanisms involve customers and sellers discovering the price together, for example an auction is 
one such mechanism. In this thesis we cover a post-price mechanism for selling a collection of virtual 




                                                      
1 Elmaghraby and Keskinocak (2003) define the distinction between these two pricing mechanisms. Yet, we recognize that 
the core of their paper is dedicated to reviewing the literature on dynamic pricing mechanism of perishable goods.  
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Chapter 3                                                                                      
Gameplay Background 
In this chapter we provide some additional details on the game we consider for this study. In the 
online game, players battle with each other head-to-head using a subset of cards acquired during 
gameplay. The game puts hard restrictions on the makeup of the subset of cards selected, called a 
deck. Each player is represented by a hero in a battle, while the cards—representing weapons, 
potions, or spells—work on the targeted hero. The ultimate goal in this game is to damage the 
opponent's hero by taking away the hero’s health points. The first player to take all of his opponent's 
hero's health points wins the battle. Players play in a sequence of games either with each other, 
against other teams of players or against a computer opponent. The core functionality of the game is 
the same, but the global objectives change depending on the type of gameplay selected by a player. 
For example, in team play, a team with the most head-to-head wins is said to win the team battle. 
Transactions in the game are executed either using premium or common in-game currencies. The 
premium in-game currency is usually acquired through conversion of real money into this currency. 
Players receive some premium in-game currency upon registration and also through regular 
gameplay; however, the total amount of premium in-game currency players can obtain in non-
purchase transactions is very limited. Common in-game currency is earned during regular gameplay 
and cannot be purchased. Accordingly, since premium in-game currency is actually purchased by 
players using real money, our analysis only considers the premium currency. We limit our attention to 
the total revenue obtained on a daily basis.2  
                                                      
2 The interplay between sales obtained from packs versus individual cards is explored in the appendix.  
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Figure 1: Daily total revenue and timing of new card releases and other external events 
In Figure 1, we present the normalized daily revenue over 320 days for our industry partner.3 From 
this figure, one can observe eight spikes in the daily revenue each corresponding to an external 
intervention. These spikes are individually labeled. Generally, we distinguish between two types of 
spikes: releases of new cards and other event types. Five of the spikes are of the former type referred 
to as Card release in this study. The latter type of events (three instances) includes advertising and 
card attribute changes referred to as Marketing. In the figure, long dashed gray lines are new card 
releases and dot grey lines are other marketing events. 
 
                                                      
3 Note: the revenue has been normalized to the request of our industry partner. Additionally, the data has been cleaned to 
remove any anomalies such as removal of employees’ accounts and automated purchases made by computer programs.  
 
Card release 1 
Marketing 1 
Card release 3 
Card release 4 
Card release 5 
Card release 2 
Marketing 2 
Marketing 3 
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Chapter 4                                                                                     
Exploring Daily Revenue Spikes Through Time-series Analysis 
Releases of new cards have a substantial impact on players’ purchasing decisions, and consequently 
on the firm’s revenue. In this chapter we carry out a time-series analysis to determine the impact of 
new releases on revenue. As mentioned in the previous chapter, we observe multiple spikes in daily 
revenue which can be categorized into two types: new card releases and other events (such as 
advertising campaigns), both of which can be classified as external interventions. Since we have a 
sequence of daily observations and we seek to extract insights regarding the effects of the external 
events on the daily revenue, we proceed by carrying out a time-series analysis. The time-series 
analysis accounts for the fact that a data sequence may have a possible internal structure, such as 
autocorrelation, trend or seasonal pattern. As the data (Figure 1) reveals no obvious trend, but exhibits 
a certain degree of intertemporal relationship, we make use of the autoregressive integrated moving 
average (ARIMA) model to determine the type of intertemporal relationship that exists in the data. 
Additionally, since we are interested in the effects induced by the external events, we embed 
intervention analysis in our ARIMA estimations. Specifically, our intervention analysis will help 
estimate the values of the spikes in generating incremental revenues. Incidentally, although our 
interest lies in determining the duration of the spikes, time-series analysis also provides a method for 
predicting impacts of similar spikes. These spikes have a big impact on daily revenue and therefore, 
pricing of newly released cards is of major interest, which is explored later in Chapter 5. 
4.1 The fundamentals of the ARIMA model 
The ARIMA model has been widely used in time-series analysis since Box and Jenkins introduced a 
method to determine the parameters for the model (1970), and is utilized in economics and social 
sciences to determine control policies and forecasting (Mccleary and Hay, 1980). This method is also 
employed by companies and governments for similar purposes, such as user prediction in mobile 
industry (Ye, 2010), or cruise tickets booking forecast (Sun et al, 2011). In our work, we use ARIMA 
modeling with intervention analysis, the impact of an event on a time series. We are not the first to 
use ARIMA for this purpose, for example Pearce, Stevenson and Perry (1985) used ARIMA to 
analyze the effect of merit pay on organization performance. 
In our time-series models, we let 𝑌!  denote the observed time series of the daily revenue. The 
time series 𝑌!  is said to follow an ARIMA model if the dth differenced series, 𝑊! ,  is a stationary 
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autoregressive moving average (ARMA) process. For example, if 𝑑 = 1, we have 𝑊! = 𝑌! − 𝑌!!!. 
ARIMA assumes homogenous non-stationary data, i.e., the mean of the time series changes from time 
period 𝑡 to time period 𝑡 − 1, and only the difference in means between time periods is constant. 
ARMA model is a special case of ARIMA model in which the difference in means between time 
periods is assumed to be zero.  
If the observed time series is stationary, then an ARMA model is applied to the sequence. There are 
two major components to an ARMA model, the autoregressive (AR) component and the moving 
average (MA) component, where 𝐴𝑅(𝑝) denotes a 𝑝 th order autoregressive process, and 𝑀𝐴(𝑞) 
denotes   and a moving average of order 𝑞. Thus, we have: 𝑌! = 𝛹!𝑌!!! + 𝛹!𝑌!!! +⋯+ 𝛹!𝑌!!! + 𝑒! + 𝛩!𝑒!!! + 𝛩!𝑒!!! +⋯+ 𝛩!𝑒!!!   , 
where 𝛹! , 𝑖 = 1,2,… , 𝑝, and Θ! , 𝑖 = 1,2,… , 𝑞 , are coefficients. 𝑒!  represents a white noise time 
series, that is, a sequence of uncorrelated, with constant variance, zero-mean random variables. The 
current value of 𝑌!  linearly combines the 𝑝 most recent past values of the time series and the 𝑞 most 
recent past values of the white noise (Cryer and Chan, 2008). 
Let 𝐵 denote  a backshift operator which recalls the previous element in a time series. For example, 𝐵𝑌! = 𝑌!!!. Using the introduced notation we know, 𝐴𝑅𝑀𝐴(𝑝, 𝑞) satisfies the equation: 𝑌! = 𝛹!𝐵𝑌! + 𝛹!𝐵!𝑌! +⋯+ 𝛹!𝐵!𝑌! + 𝑒! + 𝛩!𝐵𝑒! + 𝛩!𝐵!𝑒! +⋯+ 𝛩!𝐵!𝑒! , 
thus, 𝜑 𝐵 𝑌! = 𝜃 𝐵 𝑒! , 
where 𝜑 𝐵 = 1 − 𝛹!𝐵 − 𝛹!𝐵! −⋯− 𝛹!𝐵!; 𝜃 𝐵 = 1 + Θ!𝐵 + Θ!𝐵! +⋯+ Θ!𝐵!. 
Therefore, a time series can be represented with 𝐴𝑅𝑀𝐴(𝑝, 𝑞) model using polynomials of backshift 
operator (Wei, 1994) as:  
𝑌! = 𝜃 𝐵𝜑 𝐵 𝑒! . 
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As we discussed above, if 𝑌!  is a non-stationary sequence, but the dth difference 𝑊! , 𝑊! =(1 − 𝐵)!𝑌!, is stationary, then the sequence can be represented by an 𝐴𝑅𝐼𝑀𝐴(𝑝,𝑑, 𝑞) model: 
𝑊! = (1 − 𝐵)!𝑌! = 𝜃 𝐵𝜑 𝐵 𝑒! . 
4.2 ARIMA modeling with intervention analysis  
Intervention analysis within an ARIMA framework was introduced by Box and Tiao (1975). 
Interventions affect a time series by changing the trend or the mean. In our case this happens with the 
release of new cards into the game. Intervention analysis is used to measure the impact of the spikes 
on the time series. Specifically, intervention analysis is a tool for studying the impact of policy 
changes or other events on a time series. For example, suppose that a new maximum speed limit is 
established on a highway and the police want to learn how much the new limit affects accident rates, 
ARIMA modeling with intervention analysis can be used in this setting.  
A single intervention model that consists of a single spike in a time series can be considered as the 
simplest case. Using the notation of Cryer and Chan (2008), we introduce the dynamic intervention 
model using a linear equation. The general model for the time series is modeled by process, 𝑌! , and 
is given by: 𝑌! = 𝑚! + 𝑁! , 
where   𝑚! , is the time series process that represents the effect of the intervention and can be 
modeled as a transfer function,  𝑚!, defined by Box and Tiao (1975). In particular, the transfer 
function often uses pulse and step functions to measure intervention magnitude and duration. 𝑁!  is 
the underlying process during the intervention, assuming the intervention never occurred. In our 
analysis, 𝑁!  is defined as the underlying process during the whole time span. It is modeled as an 
ARIMA process and its parameters are estimated using the Box-Jenkins method described by Box, 
Jenkins and Reinsel (2013). According to Cryer and Chan (2008), the transfer function, 𝑚! , is 
assumed to be zero before any intervention takes place. 
The transfer function, 𝑚! , is a combination of a step function and a pulse function with only 
auto-regression (AR). As an intervention takes place at time 𝑇, the transfer function can be modeled 
as: 
𝑚! = 𝛿!𝐵𝑆!! + 𝛿!𝐵1 − 𝜔𝐵 𝑃!! , 
  10 
where 𝑆!  is a step function with 𝑆!! = 1，𝑖𝑓  𝑡 ≥ 𝑇0, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒 , 𝑃!  is a pulse function with 𝑃!! = 1，𝑖𝑓  𝑡 = 𝑇0, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒 . The backshift operator coefficients, 𝛿!, 𝛿! , and 𝜔  capture the relationship 
between time periods. 𝛿!  is the coefficient that describes the change in the mean due to the 
intervention; 𝛿!  is the coefficient that describes the magnitude of the spikes resulting from an 
intervention; 𝜔  is the auto-regression coefficient. All three coefficients are estimated from the 
available data. As 𝑚! describes the intervention on the time series, the functional form of 𝑚! enables 
us to potentially distinguish identical spikes. 
Time-series analysis, allows us to understand how long it takes for the impact of an intervention, 
such as a new card release, to decay and for the time series to revert back to its mean. The four steps 
of this analysis are shown in Figure 2.  
 
Figure 2: Intervention analysis process 
1. Preprocess Raw Data: We process the raw data by removing any anomalies that exist such as 
company employees gifting their personal accounts large sums of premium currency then 
making a large number of purchases. We also remove all company employees' business 
accounts from the data and all automated purchases made by computer programs. After 
• Generate and sort data from the database. 
• Remove outliers, e.g., employee actions. 
1.Raw data process 
• Determine ARIMA model parameters for the revenue time series.  
2. ARIMA analysis 
• Build intervention models for each period. 
• Combine the intervention models into one multiple intervetnion model 
• Determine the values of the parameters 
3. Intervention analysis 
• Determine the length of each event 
4. Interpret output 
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removing all of the outliers, we consider the daily premium currency revenue, from here on 
referred to as revenue.  
2. Conduct ARIMA Analysis: We identify the ARIMA models for prediction. First, we decide 
the order of the difference in ARIMA model, 𝑑, by differencing the observed sequence 𝑑 times 
until we obtain a stationary time series. Second, we employ the Box-Jenkins method to 
determine the parameters of autoregressive and moving average in ARIMA model, 𝑝 and 𝑞, 
respectively.  
3. Apply Intervention Analysis: We apply intervention analysis to model the transfer function of 
each spike in the revenue time series. We determine the parameters for all of the transfer 
functions, using a single ARIMA with intervention analysis model, across all 320 days (Enders, 
2008). 
4. Interpret Output: We interpret the results from the intervention analysis output. When 
applying ARIMA modeling with intervention analysis to the revenue stream, the parameter 
values and their associated standard errors are obtained using Arimax function in TSA package 
(Chan and Ripley, 2012) from R (2008). These estimations are used to determine the 
coefficients of each intervention function, defined in the intervention model. We plug in the 
determined parameter values into the original ARIMA model to determine the length of the 
impact of each intervention on the revenue time series. 
4.3 Results of intervention analysis 
We employ the Arimax() function in R to estimate our ARIMA modeling with intervention analysis 
coefficients. Various estimations of ARIMA models reveal that based on the smallest Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC), 𝐴𝑅𝐼𝑀𝐴(1,0,1), i.e. 𝐴𝑅𝑀𝐴(1,1), is the best fit model. The estimated 
coefficients are provided in Table 1: The estimation results.   






    
AR(1) 0.69  0.10      
MA(1) -0.38  0.12      
Mean 0.08  0.01      






Card release 1 0.07  0.02  0.76  0.03  0.30  0.04  
Card release 2 -0.03  0.02  0.41  0.03  0.28  0.08  
Marketing 1 -0.01  0.01  0.22  0.02  0.91  0.02  
Marketing 2 -0.01  0.01  0.11  0.03  0.60  0.17  
Marketing 3 -0.02  0.02  0.24  0.03  0.85  0.04  
Card release 3 0.08  0.02  0.84  0.03  -0.02  0.04  
Card release 4 -0.07  0.02  0.39  0.03  0.18  0.07  
Card release 5 -0.01  0.02  0.09  0.03  0.66  0.13  
log(likelihood) = 704.06 AIC = -1354.11 BIC = -1248.6 
Table 1: The estimation results 
As shown in Table 1, the first part is the estimation on the ARIMA model. With the estimated 
coefficients, the underlying time series can be presented as a linear equation: 𝑌! = 0.69𝑌!!! + 𝑒! −0.38𝑒!!! + 0.08. The coefficients of the transfer functions are displayed in the latter part of the table. 
For instance, the estimated function of the first intervention, i.e., new card release 1, can be 
interpreted as 𝑚! = 0.07𝐵𝑆!! + !.!"!!!!.!! 𝑃!!. The intervention model of each spike in the revenue 
stream could be determined using the values approximated.  
4.4 The duration and magnitude of each intervention 
Using the parameters derived from the intervention analysis (Table 1), the number of days, 𝑡, it took 
for the time series to revert back to within 10% of mean after each spike are given in Table 2. The 
formula that we use to calculate the duration, 𝑡, is  𝛿!𝜔! = 0.1 𝛿! + 𝑎 . 
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Thus,  
𝑡 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔 0.1(𝛿! + 𝑎)𝛿!𝑙𝑜𝑔𝜔 . 
Where 𝛿!, 𝛿!,  and 𝜔 are determined from the intervention analysis, and 𝑎 denotes the mean before an 
intervention takes place. Therefore, 𝑡 can be interpreted as the duration of the intervention. From the 
second column of Table 2, the impact on the revenue time series from a new card release, Card 
release 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, is 5.8 days on average. However, the durations of other interventions, 
Marketing 1, 2, and 3, can reach as long as 55 days. 
Interventions Days to decay Ratio of revenue from average 
intervention day over nominal day 
Card release 1 6 3.4 
Card release 2 5 2.6 
Marketing 1 55 1.5 
Marketing 2 10 1.3 
Marketing 3 36 1.3 
Card release 3 2 6.0 
Card release 4 4 2.2 
Card release 5 12 1.0 
Table 2: Days to decay for each event and ratio of revenue from average intervention day over 
nominal day 
 Note that, the spikes resulting from new card releases are quite different from the spikes from 
other events. The spikes of the new card releases all start with a greater revenue and decay quickly 
within a short time period. Nevertheless, spikes of other events have lower initial magnitudes, but 
decay at a slower rate.  
Interventions—with an emphasis on release of new cards—stimulate a surge in revenue for a few 
days. We find that the daily revenue during the interventions is on average 1.4 times that of during 
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nominal days (days with no intervention affect). In particular, for new card releases interventions, 
even though the number of days impacted by spikes is small, the daily revenue generated during those 
days is on average more than twice of the revenue during nominal days. We focus on new card 
releases because for the two types of spikes, new card releases and other events, the daily revenue 
proportion of the former, is 1.6 times of the latter on average. More specifically, the daily revenue 
during the first two days of new release is 21.5 times of the daily revenue during nominal days on 
average.   
From these observations, we conclude that initial card prices are of paramount importance during a 
new card release. The amount of revenue realized per day is higher than during any other day of the 
year, but the time window during which these high revenues may be realized is very small. Because 
of this small window, it is crucial that cards are priced correctly when released. The first step towards 
correct pricing is determining the relative pricing of cards by using the card usage data that we refer 
to as card quality.  
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Chapter 5                                                                                              
Initial Pricing of Cards: an Elo Rating Approach 
In this chapter we propose an approach based on the Elo rating system to help set initial prices of card 
as they are released to the market. The first step is determining the cards’ relative prices. This is 
achieved by utilizing the cards’ usage data and inferring their relative inherent quality. Specifically, 
we observe how players use their cards, and presumably determine each card's quality, assuming 
players play with cards that are of higher quality. One effective method to distinguish quality in a 
group is the Elo rating system. Traditionally, the Elo rating system is used to evaluate the skills of 
players in a given game. It was originally used in chess, but is now frequently employed in online 
gaming to measure the skills of players. 
The Elo rating system is named after Arpad Elo, who invented the method to rate chess players 
(Elo, 1978). The purpose of this system is to measure chess players' skill by updating their ratings as 
players proceed with the game over time. Reid and Nixon (2011) employ Elo ratings to reduce human 
inaccuracies when obtaining human descriptions of soft biometric traits, such as height, hair color, 
hair length, etc. Similar to Reid and Nixon (2011), we use Elo ratings to infer the relative 
performance of objects. Namely, we use Elo ratings to infer players' relative preference of one card to 
another using historical data. To understand our method, we first discuss how the Elo rating system is 
traditionally used.  
5.1 The Elo ratings specifics 
The Elo ratings measure players’ strengths based on observable match outcomes, where a player 
either wins, loses or draws the match. The outcomes reflect players’ abilities. Based on past 
outcomes, and assuming players’ skills are normally distributed, we compute players’ ratings and 
probability of winning upcoming matches.  
A player’s Elo rating increases or decreases according to the outcomes of previous games between 
other rated players. After every match, points transfer from the losing player to the winning player. 
The amount of points transferred is a function of players’ ratings, with the amount determined by the 
difference in players’ ratings. The difference in the amount of points transferred makes the Elo rating 
system self-correcting: players' true rating is found through the course of gameplay. Another 
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advantage of the system allows new players to join at any time without having to adjust existing 
players' ratings.  
The Elo rating system predicts match outcomes. Let 𝑅!represent the Elo rating of player A before a 
match with player B, and let 𝑅′! be the Elo rating of player A after the match with player B. 𝐸! is 
player A’s probability of winning the match against player B, and S! is player A’s actual score after 
the match. If player A won, 𝑆! = 1; otherwise, 𝑆! = 0. Ties are excluded in our study and hence are 
not discussed herein.  
Let 𝑄! = 10!!!"" (Elo, 1978) be a transformation of 𝑅! serving as a proxy of the likelihood of player 
A winning a match against a random opponent. The expected score of player A from playing against 
player B is defined as follows: 
𝐸! = 𝑄!𝑄! + 𝑄! . 𝑅′!  is updated using the following formula: 𝑅′! = 𝑅! + 𝐾(𝑆! − 𝐸!), 
where 𝐾 is the maximum possible adjustment per match, and is any positive constant set a priori. 
Essentially, 𝐾 as specifying how much the most recent match outcome affects players’ ratings. 
5.2 Set-based Elo rating method 
In this section we formalize our proposed method, which we refer to as the set-based Elo rating 
method. In the game we analyze, players select a subset of 𝑖 cards—a deck—out of their total number 
of cards, 𝑘, which may very well exceed 𝑖. When playing a battle, players select their strongest deck. 
As we do not know how players select their decks, we assume that they use a single Round-Robin 
tournament to select cards. That is, within their card collections, they compare every two cards head-
to-head once and select the best 𝑖 cards.  
However, in the available data, we only observe the top 𝑖 cards, 40 in our case, selected by each 
player. We assume that these 40 cards are the 40 highest scoring cards in the single Round-Robin 
tournament. Therefore, each card individually in the 40 selected cards is said to win against each of 
the unselected cards in a head-to-head comparison.  
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The initial Elo ratings are equally assigned to each card. Once the selected card set and the 
unselected card set in a deck are identified, we update the Elo ratings assuming each card in the 
selected cards wins against each of the unselected cards in a head-to-head comparison. Since there are 
millions of players’ decks available in the data, a higher value card will be identified by the Elo 
ratings determined from the described set-based comparison method across all players. We also 
acknowledge that cards may have synergistic properties, for example card 1 and card 2 individually 
may not be preferred, but together they are strongly preferred. We do not account for such synergies 
in our analysis, and make this simplifying assumption in order to ease our study given the available 
data. 
We next formulate our set-based Elo rating method. Assume each player has a set of cards he 
owns, 𝑆 , and each player enters a match with a deck, {𝐷}, that is a subset of 𝑆 . Then all cards in {𝐷} are considered to be the most preferred cards of 𝑆  and thus beat all cards that are not selected, 𝑆 − 𝐷 . We then update the Elo ratings of all cards in {𝐷} and 𝑆 − 𝐷 . We repeat this process for 
every game played and as new cards are introduced in the game. 
In our set-based Elo rating system, it is assumed that all the cards in the selected set {𝐷} are better 
than the cards in the unselected set 𝑆 − 𝐷 , thus every single card in {𝐷} can beat every single card 
in 𝑆 − 𝐷 , in a head-to-head comparison as: 𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑑! ≻ 𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑑! ,∀  𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑑! ∈ 𝐷,∀  𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑑! ∈ 𝑆 − 𝐷 . 
We assume that cards in {𝐷} and {𝑆 − 𝐷} are not compared to other cards in {𝐷} and {𝑆 − 𝐷} 
respectively. 
The set-based Elo rating is updated as: 𝑅′!"#!! = 𝑅!"#!! + 𝐾(𝑆!"#!! − 𝐸!"#!!), 𝑅′!"#!! = 𝑅!"#!! + 𝐾(𝑆!"#!! − 𝐸!"#!!), ∀  𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑑! ∈ 𝐷,∀  𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑑! ∈ 𝑆 − 𝐷 , 
where 𝑆!"#!! = 1 , and 𝑆!"#!! = 0 , and 𝐸!"#!! = !!"#!!!!"#!!!!!"#!! , and 𝑄!"#!! = 10!!"#!!!"" , 𝐸!"#!!  and 𝑄!"#!! are analogously defined. 
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5.3 Comparing head-to-head Elo ratings to set-based Elo ratings 
In this section, we show that as the number of selected decks tends to infinity, the set-based Elo 
ratings of a card collection will approach the traditional Elo ratings that we refer to as the head-to-
head Elo ratings. 
Below we show the results of two representative simulations carried out to examine the 
performance of the set-based Elo ratings method as compared to the head-to-head Elo ratings. In 
these simulations, we assume there are 10 cards to be considered in total with their global preference 
ordering set a pirori. In the set-based Elo ratings simulation, each participant, i.e. player, is assumed 
to own 5 cards out of the total 10 cards. Each time, a participant is required to select a random 
number, uniformly distributed from 1 to 4, of cards from his card collection. Using the assumption 
that we discussed in the previous section, any selected card is said to be better than any unselected 
card, we proceed to determine the Elo ratings according to participants’ selections.  
In contrast, since the Elo rating system is traditionally developed for paired comparisons, we also 
determine cards’ ratings using the head-to-head selection. In this simulation, we compare only two of 
the 10 cards at a time, with the preferred one beating the other card. The Elo ratings of these 10 cards 
are calculated based on the outcomes of the paired comparisons. 
We proceed to compare the ratings obtained from these two simulations when 𝐾 = 1 , we 
qualitatively observe the same results for different values of K. The number of the observations are 
1000 and 1,000,000, respectively. As shown in Figure 3, we find that as the number of observations 
increases, the ratings of the set based Elo method approach the ratings of the head-to-head method. 
The correlation coefficient between the set-based Elo method and the head-to-head Elo method is 
0.9987 with 1,000,000 observations. This implies that the relative ranking of the cards can be 
estimated to a high degree of precision as the number of observations increases. 
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Figure 3: The ratings from set-based Elo method, uniformly choosing 1 to 4 cards within 5 cards, and 
the head-to-head Elo method, randomly choosing any two cards, with different observations 
 
We now formally show the relationship between the set based and head-to-head Elo rating systems. 
Proposition 1. In a set-based Elo rating method, the number of times that any two cards are 
compared tends to infinity as the number of observations tends to infinity. 
Proof. Assuming we have 𝑛 cards in total, the probability of any two cards being randomly selected 
for head-to-head comparison is !!! . Now consider the set-based Elo rating method. Of the 𝑛 cards, 𝑘 
cards, 𝑘 ≥ 2, form a player’s card collection, 𝑆 , and out of these k cards, the best 𝑖 cards are 
selected to be the player’s deck 𝐷 . Assuming uniform distribution over the cards in the set, the 
probability of any one card being selected in 𝐷  and another one being left in 𝑆 − 𝐷  is 𝑝, and  𝑝 
satisfies the following inequality:  
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𝑝 ≥ 1!!!!!! ∙ 1𝑘 − 1 > 0, 
where !!!!!!!  is the probability of selecting any two specific cards, 𝐴 and 𝐵, into 𝑆 , and !!!! is a lower 
bound on the probability of keeping 𝐴 and not 𝐵 in {𝐷}. As 𝑝 is always non-zero, therefore if the 
number of observations tends to infinity, the number of times any two cards are compared tends to 
infinity. !  
According to the proof described above, if we have a sufficiently large number of observations, all 
card comparisons are observed. Before implementing the set-based Elo rating method to the data in 
our study, we test if the data has enough observations to generate accurate set-based Elo ratings. This 
data set is tested by simulating the card selection process in the game. We calculate the rank 
correlation of the set-based Elo ratings to a pre-determined card ranking. The simulation stops when 
we reach a rank correlation of 0.99. Afterwards, we verify that the number of observations in the data 
exceeds this threshold.   
Simulating the game, we have 𝑛=500, 𝑖=40, and 𝑘 follows a normal distribution with mean of 150 
and standard deviation of 30, bounded between 41 and 500. Once Spearman’s rank correlation 
reaches a coefficient of 0.99 (Sheskin, 2003), the simulation is stopped. Figure 4 demonstrates the 
occurrence of the event after 200,000 iterations. In the game we study there are 3,774,517 
observations in total, which exceeds the minimum threshold of 200,000, and hence allows us to use 
the set-based Elo rating method. 
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Figure 4: Correlation tracked with number of observations 
5.4 Implementing the rating system 
As the number of observations in our data is sufficient to compare any two cards using the set-based 
Elo rating method, we now proceed to implement this method in order to obtain the relative card 
quality, and ultimately to set initial card prices. 
Any new card has an Elo rating of 1500 and this rating is updated as more and more deck 
information is observed. Remember that our goal is to determine the in-game market prices of cards 
when they are first released. Our industry partner makes new cards available in a pre-release sale 
during which cards may only be acquired in card packs. We focus on the Elo ratings of new cards 
after the pre-release sale and before the market release date to help determine their initial prices. 
However, we still update all cards’ Elo ratings before and after the pre-release sale to measure all 
cards’ quality.  
We use Elo ratings to measure the card quality, hence, we expect that ratings are linked with prices, 
as well as the number of units sold for all cards. Once the Elo ratings of the cards are computed, we 
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use Spearman’s rank and Person’s correlation to measure the two relationships between cards’ Elo 
ratings and card revenue, and between cards’ Elo ratings and units sold.  
Since the Pearson’s correlation measure the linear dependence between two variables, we use 𝑄! = 10!!!"" to linearize the normal-scaled ratings before calculating Pearson’s correlations, where we 
refer to 𝑄! as the modified Elo rating. The modified Elo rating is used when calculating the Pearson’s 
correlation coefficient to determine the linear correlation between cards’ Elo ratings and card 
revenue, as well as the units sold. 
5.5 Using Spearman’s and Pearson’s correlations to measure performance 
We use Spearman's and Pearson's correlations to measure how well our set-based Elo method predicts 
aggregate revenue and aggregate number of units sold across all available cards in twelve days from 
the new card release day. The reason we use 12 days is that this is the maximum duration of any of 
the card release interventions, see Table 2. 
Current card prices are updated based on normalized daily revenue of the cards, an approximation 
of the gradient of the price function. We use these current price values for comparison to our Elo 
rating method. As the card price has a direct relationship with revenue, we also use the number of 
units sold for each card when comparing the performance of the proposed Elo method to update card 
prices.  The number of units sold is a proxy for potential revenue, as we observed some high selling 
cards, did not have their prices updated due to the price update method used by our industry partner.  
We carry out a similar calculation for the same cards' Elo ratings, available through card usage data 
available from pre-release sales. Only when we determine Pearson’s correlation coefficients, we 
employ the modified Elo ratings, and otherwise we use the Elo ratings of the cards. As we know, 
Pearson’s correlation coefficient measures the strength of a linear association between two variables, 
while Spearman’s rank correlation measures the strength of association between the ranks of the two 
variables and identifies whether the two variables relate in a monotonic fashion.  
As shown in Figure 5 and Figure 6, the Spearman’s rank correlation and the Pearson’s correlation 
both yield a strong correlation between cards' Elo ratings and the daily revenue. 
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Figure 5: Spearman's rank correlation between prices and revenue, and between Elo ratings and 
revenue 
 
Figure 6: Pearson's correlation between prices and revenue, and between modified Elo and revenue 
Using rank correlation, price starts out having a similar level of correlation as the Elo ratings and 
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that in terms of revenue prediction on the basis of rank, Elo does not have an advantage over the 
current price update method. 
Using Pearson’s correlation, which also takes the actual size of variables, rather than their order, 
into account, we can see that modified Elo ratings may offer an improved prediction of future revenue 
on certain days, in particular, the first day, in which a large proportion of the revenue is made. This 
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Figure 8: Pearson's correlation between prices and units sold, and between modified Elo and units 
sold 
From Figure 7 and Figure 8, we find that the correlation between price and units sold is lower than 
the correlation between Elo ratings and the units sold for all days. In Figure 7, Spearman’s rank 
correlation of price would approach Elo ratings when predicting units sold. However, Elo ratings 
always have a better correlation. The fact that the price correlation curve approaches the Elo curve in 
Figure 7 after approximately two weeks suggests that to capture the same information about the 
number of units sold, it will take the price updating mechanism used by our industry partner more 
than two weeks after cards are released. Conversely, card Elo ratings give as much information about 
the number of cards sold as card prices will after approximately two weeks. In Figure 8, the Elo 
ratings can predict the number of units sold with Pearson’s correlation coefficient value of 
approximately 0.55. As a comparison, the correlation coefficient between the number of units sold 
and the current price is at most 0.25. One would think card quality is related to price, as higher quality 
goods may be expected to have higher demand not accounting for budgetary constraints.  However, 
our study shows that card quality, as measured by cards' Elo ratings, is a better indicator of number of 
units sold than daily price. It is therefore concluded that cards may be mispriced on any given day.   
The figures above show that the cards are mispriced. Therefore, the revenue can be increased by 
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have a Pearson's correlation value of at most 0.25 with the number of units sold, it follows that some 
participants are willing to buy high priced cards. However, as Elo ratings suggest, with a correlation 
of at least 0.52 with the number of units sold, some cards may need to be priced higher or lower than 
their initial values in order to increase sales and potentially increase revenue. Note, that this is hard to 
test from the available data as current price and revenue are closely related.   
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Chapter 6                                                                                 
Concluding Remarks 
In this thesis we applied multiple intervention time-series analysis, ARIMA modeling with 
intervention analysis, to assess the observed effects of a company’s operational events on sales. This 
time-series analysis includes the selection of suitable models, the estimation of model parameters, and 
the application of these models to actual sales data. Specific attention was given to clustering similar 
events, such as new card releases, and to the initial daily sales as new sets were released. This 
approach can generally be employed to analyze sales data with multiple interventions, and forecast 
the features of similar events in the future. Moreover, since the magnitude and the duration of any 
identical event are predictable, a company can adopt this approach to determine not only the 
appropriate timing to release new items to the market, but also the number of new item varieties to 
release in one event as the company maximizes its revenue. In addition, this thesis can also be 
extended to customer relationship management. For example, if a company were to permanently alter 
its prices of existing goods, or change the makeup of its goods, such as decrease size of food 
products, a similar study can measure the impact of such decisions on a company's existing customer 
base.      
In addition to investigating time-series data from revenue, customer relations, or other, we show 
that the Elo rating system may be used to evaluate perceived quality of a product line. We also 
showed that the Elo rating system can be used to not only compare items head-to-head but also a set 
of items to another set of items. In our study, the one set of items are said to be "selected" while 
another set of items are said to be "not selected." We showed that if we update items' Elo ratings by 
assuming items in the selected set "beat" items in the not selected set, then the Elo ratings of all items 
converge to the same Elo ratings obtained from head-to-head. This, more general, set-based form of 
Elo comparisons may be employed by retailers to determine shelf space of a product collection, 
websites to determine the collection of links on each page, and organizations to compare departments 
of one another. Therefore, the trend of customer preference can be tracked using the set-based Elo 
rating method; thus, the retailer can make decisions to withdraw or provide an item. Finally, we 
believe that Elo ratings can help organizations evaluate their portfolio of items as they are added or 
removed. In particular, as Elo ratings are history-independent and self-correcting, they allow 
organizations to use Elo ratings for new and old items alike. 
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Application of the ARIMA modeling with intervention analysis and the Elo rating system to the 
sales data provided by our industry partner confirmed the reliability of our method. Therefore, our 




Study	  on	  Card	  Distribution	  Channels	  
1. Revenue	  Discrepancy	  Between	  Two	  Distribution	  Channels	  
The two current distribution channels—single card market and card pack bundles—are used by our 
industry partner in their online game. The single card market displays all cards used in the game. If a 
player is after a particular card, then the player may purchase the card in the single card market. A 
card pack bundle is a collection of unknown cards draw from the single card market according to a 
known probability. Both distribution channels can provide all the cards for players.  
We pre-process the data and group all the purchased items into three categories: packs, single 
cards, and miscellaneous. The packs category and the card category include all the packs and cards 
purchased, respectively. The miscellaneous category includes items purchased to upgrade the hero’s 
ability or to enlarge the deck size. We proceed to calculate the revenues of each category accordingly. 
The packs’ revenue and the single card market revenue contribute to approximate 57% and 23% of 
the total revenue, respectively. It is noted that the packs’ revenue is more than twice of the single card 
revenue, which inspires us to explore the motivation that drives players to buy packs rather than 
single cards in the market. 
Since a player only knows the probability of getting a particular card, purchasing a pack essentially 
reflects the player’s gambling behaviour. However, there are other players who do not like taking 
chances to get a particular card, but prefer the single card market. In this appendix, we will discuss 
the revenue discrepancy and the players’ risk attitudes. One explanation for this revenue discrepancy 
between the two distribution channels is that players make a trade-off between the currency spent and 
the value gained from the purchase. The result implies that given the same amount of in-game 
currency spent, a player would get more value from buying packs than from buying single cards.  
2. The	  Single	  Card	  Market	  Revenue	  Summary	  
We first show the current revenue of the single cards in the market in Figure A-1 before comparing 
the two distribution channels. We calculate the revenue from the sales records and then sort the 
revenue from the largest to the smallest. Figure A- 1 reveals that 40% of the cards attribute to 90% of 
the total revenue in the single card market, while 25% of the cards attribute to 80% of the total 
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revenue. The revenue of the top 10% cards is significantly higher than the rest of the cards, which 
suggests that several cards have significantly higher demands than other cards.    
 
Figure A- 1: Proportion of total revenue from cards 
3. Thresholds	  of	  Players	  Purchasing	  Decision 
Since players prefer popular cards and avoid getting the same cards they already owns, choosing a 
proper distribution channel is to weigh values gained from the two distribution channels according to 
the players’ card collections. We introduce threshold, 𝑇, to determine whether a player would buy a 
card in the single card market or buy pack bundles. This threshold indicates which players gain a 
positive utility from purchasing a particular card or a particular set of cards. 
Consider this following example. There are two players, player A and player B, both are interested 
in owning card X. Player A currently owns 20 cards in his card collection, while player B owns 300 
  31 
cards. The price of the card X in the single card market is 46 in-game currency, while the pack may 
contents this card is priced at 110 in-game currency. As a new player, player A’s priority is to expand 
the card collection. Player A would choose to buy the pack, he might receive card X from the pack 
along with other cards. He would be satisfied with getting other popular but valuable cards that are 
not in his card collection. Player B, on the other hand, would choose to buy card X from the single 
card market. Given player B’s large card collection, if he buys the pack, it is very likely that he will 
get some cards he already owns, which are not valuable at all to him. In this example, we show that 
each player has a certain threshold to value cards based on their card collections.  
In order to determine the threshold,  𝑇, of each player, we introduce a criterion, 𝐷, which we refer to 
as distance. As discussed in the previous example, more discerning players would consider a card 
valuable if the card’s price is closer to the card’s upper bounds price, while less discerning players 
may accept a larger range. Given 𝐷, the threshold is determined using the formula:  𝑇 = 𝐿𝐵 + 𝐷 ∗ 𝑈𝐵 − 𝐿𝐵 , 
where 𝐿𝐵: 𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟  𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑  𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒  𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝑡ℎ𝑒  𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑑,  𝑈𝐵: 𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑟  𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑  𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒  𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝑡ℎ𝑒  𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑑,  𝐷 ∈ [0,1].  𝐿𝐵 and 𝑈𝐵 are prices that set up by our industry partner in their current pricing mechanism. Namely, 𝐿𝐵 and 𝑈𝐵 are constraints imposed on the prices of the cards. 𝐷 is a threshold parameter. More 
discerning players have a value of 𝐷 closer to one; while less discerning players have a lower 𝐷 
closer to zero. For example, a value of 𝐷 = 0  means all cards are welcome by a player. Hence, the 
cards are considered to have their original values in the single card market. However, a value of 𝐷 = 1 means the player only wants those cards sold at the upper bound price, and all other cards are 
assigned a value of zero. After having a better understanding of the threshold, we calculate the 
expected values of the packs with respect to the single cards’ prices. When comparing expected 
values of the packs with their current pack prices, rational players will choose the one with higher 
value.   
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4. Expected	  Value	  of	  Packs	  for	  Risk-­‐neutral	  and	  Risk-­‐averse	  Players	  
As mentioned above, the other factor that affects players’ purchasing decision is the player’s risk 
attitude. The simplest scenario is that players are risk-neutral, meaning a player is indifferent between 
choices with equal expected payoffs even if one choice is riskier. For example, if two alternatives are 
offered: (i) $50 with 100% certainty or (ii) a 50% chance each of $100 and $0, then a risk neutral 
player would have no preference since the expected value of the latter case is also $50. However, a 
risk seeking (respectively, averse) player might prefer the latter (respectively, former) alternative. 
There are several different packs available in the online game. We randomly picked one of them to 
carry out the D-criterion analysis. Let us refer to this pack as Pack A. Table A- 1 provides the 
expected value of Pack A on the basis of single card market prices with different 𝐷 values. According 
to the first column of Table A- 1, if the price of Pack A is 10 in-game currency, players pursuing 
cards with 𝐷 =   0.7 would buy the specific cards in the single card market. Otherwise, players would 
prefer seeking more value from buying packs. The number of players with 𝐷 above 0.7 is relatively 
small among all the players, which explains the observation that the revenue from selling packs is 
almost twice of the revenue from selling the single cards. 
Even though it is unlikely that all players are exactly risk neutral, players who are risk-seeking 
would buy packs even if the received expected value is less than the cost of the pack. However, risk-
averse players would prefer buying packs if the expected value that could receive from the pack is 
greater than the pack’s price.  
There was some work on investigating how risk-averse a player is. The bounds for the risk aversion 
parameter is obtained based on an study conducted by Taylor (2013) by assuming that utility is 
described using the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function, 
𝑢 𝑊 = 𝑊 !!!1 − 𝑟 , 
where 𝑢 𝑊  represents the consumer’s utility with payoff of 𝑊. 𝑟 is the risk averse coefficient of 
CRRA. 𝑟   = 0 indicates risk neutrality, while values of 𝑟 > 0  indicate different magnitudes of risk 
aversion. As 𝑟 increases the utility decreases, and when 𝑊 increases the utility increases. The utility 
function says, given a value of 𝑟, as the payoff becomes greater, the less a participant would care 
about an increment in revenue. For example, an increase of $100 is more substantial when a player is 
endowed with $200 than having another $100 when the player endowed with $2 million.  
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The expected utility of Pack A for players with different thresholds and different risk-averse 
degrees is shown in Table A- 1. After comparing the utility gained from each distribution channel, 
players in the grey area will find buying packs more valuable than buying single cards in the market. 
As can be seen from the table, given a certain 𝑟, players with a higher threshold tend to be customers 
of the single card market. The reason is that, with a cost of the pack, they would get less than the 
value of the pack’s price. Given a certain threshold, however, players who are more risk-averse would 
find the single card market more appealing since there is no risk in the single card market. 
 
r 
0 0.15 0.29575 0.4415 0.55925 0.677 
D 
0 7.3 5.4 4.3 3.7 3.5 3.6 
0.1 4.9 3.6 2.7 2.2 2.0 2.0 
0.2 3.9 2.8 2.0 1.6 1.4 1.3 
0.3 2.7 1.9 1.3 1.0 0.9 0.8 
0.4 2.1 1.5 1.0 0.8 0.7 0.6 
0.5 1.5 1.0 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.4 
0.6 1.1 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.3 
0.7 0.8 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.2 
0.8 0.7 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 
0.9 0.7 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 
1.0 0.7 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 
Pack utility 
 
1.0 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.7 
Table A- 1: Expected utility of Pack A with respect to D (the criterion) and r (the risk aversion 
coefficient). The values of utility are normalized and rounded. The r values were selected based on 
Taylor (2013). Shaded cells reflect preference for individual card; otherwise the player prefers a pack. 
5. Suggestions	  of	  balancing	  two	  distribution	  channels	  
We already comprehend how the players compare the expected utilities between the two distribution 
channels. The explanation of the large discrepancy in revenue is that, players find that buying packs 
brings more utility than buying cards individually. This imbalanced expected utility is coming from 
our industry partner’s different pricing mechanisms for each distribution channel. The pack prices are 
fixed; while card prices in the market, however, are adjusted along with the demand, which suggest 
that the card prices reflect the inherent value better than the pack prices. The observation that more 
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players buy packs instead of single cards implies that the packs are relatively underpriced. Therefore, 
from the company’s perspective, more welfare can be obtained to maximize the revenue. 
The basic principle to improve the current pricing system is to eliminate the imbalance between the 
two distribution channels. Since the prices for packs are fixed currently, the main purpose of our 
following suggestions is to make the packs’ prices become dynamic, for example, as a function of the 
demand, replacing with a new draw distribution, or expand the range between the upper bound price 
and lower bound price.  
First of all, pack prices should fluctuate as a function of market prices. If the demand changes, the 
prices of packs change as well. For example, if a card’s price increases, the price of the pack that may 
content this card should also increase. Therefore, players who want this card from the single card 
market will not turn to take their risks to buy the pack. 
Second, the probability of receiving a card from a draw should be set as a function of the card’s 
market price. Currently, the draw is uniformly distributed, which is the probability of getting each 
card is the same despite of price differences. We suggest that, the higher a card’s price is, the lower 
the probability of receiving that card in a pack will be.   
Last but not least, a dynamic upper bound change policy can be implemented in the pack pricing 
system, which is, if the price of a card reaches the upper bound price, then raise the card’s upper 
bound price. The reason why we update upper bound and lower bound prices is that upper bound and 
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